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Women in Law
Abstract
As mentioned earlier, the Bergmann model predicts that female and male lawyers will be segregated into
different areas of practice. If this is the case, what are the forces behind this sector-specific segregation?
On the supply side, Becker relies on the Neoclassical theories of utility maximization and human capital
theory. These theories suggest that an increase in the store of human capital through training and
education will be undertaken by the employee or provided by the employer if the benefits exceed the cost.
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Is it possible that pecuniary
discrimination, which is illegal, is being
supplemented by other forms of discrimination
and pressures against female lawyers? If so,
how is it being manifested?
This study will attempt to reconcile the
views presented by academic theory with those
expounded by members ofthe legal profession.
Following reviews of.discrimination theory and
previous research, a section will be devoted to
explaining the empirical model that is to be
utilized in this paper. Results and policy
implications will also be presented.
19).

Barb Kube '94 graduated from IWU last
spring with a degree in economics and now
attends law school at the University of
Illinois. The following paper is from Barb's
Research Honors class. While at IWU,
Barb was president of the Economics
Society and the Intro"to Economics tutor.

Women in Law
by Barb Kube

II. AN OVERCROWDING MODEL OF
GENDER DISCRIMINAnON IN LAW: _.

L INTRODUCTION

Harvard Law School first admitted women
in 1950. Harvard was not alone in its long
standing opposition to an open admissions
policy. Notre Dame's law school waited until
1969 to begin enrolling women, and the law
schQo.l at Washington and Lee University did
not implement a similar policy until 1972
(Epstein 1981, p. 50). Today females
account for 40-50% of law school enrollment
and around 22% of our nation's lawyers
(ROUNDTABLE 2,1993, p. 19).
Despite evidence that no overt wage
discrimination exists between the sexes, 54%
offemale lawyers (and 290A. ofmale lawyers)
feel that men have a greater chance of
becoming involved with firm management
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 21). Furthermore,
when "Gilda" (a female attorney who
responded on condition of anonymity) was
asked "Do you know what it takes to make
partner in your finn?", a male colleague
replied, "A sex change". "Gilda" countered,
"Good point"(ROUNDTABLE 1, 1993, p.
20). Still another female lawyer reports that
the firm she is working for It actually
discourages women from practicing law once
they have started a family"(ROUNDTABLE 1,

Labor market discrimination occurs
whenever men and women of equal
productivity and aspirations are treated
differently in hiring, retention, training, and
promotion practices (Hoffinan, p. 2).
Economists generally agree on these
principles, but they do not always agree on
theoretical explanations of this phenomena.
Perhaps this is because individual labor
markets are unique. Also, it may be that the
explanations oflabor market discrimination are
as diverse as the disciplines that study it. Six
general explanations include:
1.
neoclassical, based on models of
statistical discrimination and investments in
human capital;
2. social psychological, emphasizing
socialization and internalized norms;
3. institutional, emphasizing the intended
and unintended consequences and inertia of
organizational arrangements;
4. cultural, emphasizing taken-for-granted
notions of men's work and women's work,
often shared by both men and women;
5.
political, stressing the different interests
ofmale employers and employees with respect
to maintaining the status quo; and
49

6. patriarchal, emphasizing the common
interests of male workers and employers in
maintain a sex-based division oflabor (Bielby,
p. 107). One economic theory that can
potentially capture moSt ofthese effects is Dr.
Barbara Bergmann's model of labor market
overcrowding, and Bergmann's model serves
as the central framework for this study.
Rather than looking at a-labor market as the
sum of its parts, Bergmann argues that
stereotypes and society's perceptions about
what is "nonnal" actually divide labor markets
into two separate labor markets--one for males
and the other for females--in which the
individuals are perfect substitutes. Bergmann's
theory is summarized in Figure 1 on the
following page (Blau/Ferber 1992, p.214).
Suppose the undiscriminating market of
(f+m), which pays wage WO, experiences
discrimination and divides into a market for
those discriminated against (f) and one for the
preferred co-workers (m). Demand is no
longer in the form ofDEMAND(f+m), but is
rather DEMANDf and DEMANDm. Jobs in
the separate market (m) are filled by a
restricted supply of labor (m) and wages for
(m) inc(ease. Also, members of (f) must
"crowd" into a restricted number of positions
if they want to remain in the market. As
Figure 1 (on -the next page) illustrates, pay
differentials will develop whenever, relative to
their respective supplies, -DEMANDm is
greater than DEMANDf. More females are
"crowded" into a market that faces less
demand. Lower wages for females result from
each female attorney being less productive
because she has less capital with which to
work. As previously mentioned, those who
remain in market (m) receive higher wages;
members of(m) are more productive because
each has more capital to work with. Thus, as
seen in Figure 1 (see next page), both groups
are paid according to their productivity. It is
The Park Place Economist v.3

important to remember that group (f) is forced
to be less produ~ive--they are forced into a
crowded market (Blau/Ferber, pp. 212-15).
In terms of the labor market for lawyers,
the .overcrowding model predicts that 1)
female lawyers (f) will be paid less than their
male counterparts (m), and that 2) a barrier
exists between labor markets (f) and (m)
which segregates female and male lawyers into
different areas of practice. Whereas
Bergmann's model directly suggests a testable
hypothesis regarding male and female roles
within the legal profession (crowding), it does
not offer as obyious of an,explanation for the
causes of crowding. Other theories may
provide greater insight into the causes of any
apparent crowding.
A. BECKER'S ECONOMICS OF
DISCRIMINAnON
On the demand side, female participation in
the legal labor market (f) is influenced by
employers, consumers, and fellow employees.
What causes these three groups to treat female
lawyers as fundamentally different from their
male counterparts?- One of the pioneering
theories of discrimination, developed by Dr.
Gary S. Becker, provides further insight into
In his The Economics of
this issue.
Discrimination
(1957, 1971),
Becker
theorizes that employers, employees, and
consumers have different "tastes" for
discrimination which cause them to act "as ire
they are "willing to pay something either
directly or in the form of a reduced income to
be associated with some persons instead of
others"; the dollar value that each individual is
willing to "pay" to put up with working with
certain individuals is called a discrimination
coefficient (DC).
Employers and consumers perceive net
wages and net prices as relatively higher
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Figure 1: A Model of Labor Market Overcrowding
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(f)

because they are "paying" for undesirable .
associations with the discriminated-against
person; their DC is positive. Similarly,
discriminating employees perceive lower net
wages because of the "disutility" associated
with working with the discriminated-against
co-worker, and therefore have a negative DC.
Non-discriminators have a DC ofzero.
In terms of this study, if wf is the wage
received by female lawyers (the discriminated
against factor) and wm is the wage of male
lawyers, assuming that productivity is equal,
wf 'should equal wm. However, the full cost
that a discriminating employer perceives when
employing a female lawyer is (wf+ DCemp).
Thus, if the male atto~ey receives wm, the
discriminated against female receives (wm 
DCemp) (Becker 1971, pp. 14-15). At least
in the short-run, the differences in DCs will
result in wage differentials and job segregation
across firms.

In his The Economics of
Discrimination, Gary Becker
theorizes that employers,
employees and consumers
have different "tastes" for
discrimination.
Using the Neoclassical theories of marginal
productivjty and utility maximization, as well
as the assumption of competition, Becker
contends that firms with lower DCs should
have lower production costs. Lower
production costs give firms with lower DCs a
comparative advantage. If the comparative
advantage persists, ceteris paribus, it will
drive finns with higher DCs out ofthe market
and eliminate discrimination--firms will
The Park Place Economist v.3
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compete by lowering DCs until the DC for
surviving firms is zero.
However, the persistence of discrimination
depends on the market structure. As the
market becomes less competitive, employers
can engage in higher degrees of discrimination
without fearing cut-throat wage competition
(Blau/Ferber, pp. 203-4).
Within the .legal profession, competition
may be inhibited by several factors. Consumer
and employee discrimination are two such
factors. Even if an employer has no taste for
discrimination, he/she may, in the name of
profit-maximizing, be forced to discriminate
when other employees or customers have
discriminatory tastes (BlaulFerber). One
example might involve firms specializing in -: .-.
labor law; union officials have been known to
be reluctant and even opposed to working with
female attorneys (ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 28).
Ifunions refuse to be represented by a female,
the productivity of the female lawyer is
diminished. Rather than hiring a female
attorney, the firm will opt for hiring a male;
supply oflabor lawyers is restricted, and their
wages increase. Becker's assumption of
perfect competition is not maintained.
As mentioned earlier, the Bergmann model
predicts that female and male lawyers will be
segregated into different areas of practice. If
this is the case, what are the forces behind this
sector-specific segregation? On the supply
side, Becker relies on the Neoclassical theories
of utility maximization and human capital
theory. These theories suggest that an
increase in the store of human capital through
training and education will be undertaken by
. the employee or provided by the employer if
the benefits exceed the cost.
There are two types of training: general
training and firm-specific training. General
training will increase an individual's
productivity to the same extent no matter

where he/she works. With firm-specific
training, as its' name implies, skills cannot be
transferred to another firm. Who pays for the
training will likely depend on who receives the
benefits. In most cases, the individual pays for •
general training. Since it is mutually
beneficial, the cost offirm-specific training is
often shared by both the employer and
employee. Thus, because the employer bears
part ofthe cost, he/she is concerned with the
expected employment life of the employee-
how long will the firm benefit from its
investment in the training (BlaulFerber, pp.
164-67)? Between two equally qualified
candidates, a profit-maximizing finn would
hire or promote the employee with the longest
expected employment life. Often this decision
is based on group averages or stereotypes.
(Decisions based on such averages will be
discussed in the next section.)
With respect to the legal profession, it is
assumed that each individual starts out with
similar.general training--a law school degree.
Although there may be differences with
respect to experience--Iaw journal, internship,
and clerkship activities-when two individuals
enter practice at the same level and at the same
time, it is assumed that they are equally
productive, ceteris paribus. When the job is
secured, human capital (productivity) is
enhanced by finn-specific training such as
mentor-protege relationships, "power" lunches
and the like. Becker postulates that profit
maximizers will invest in the employee with
the longest expected employment life.
Furthermore, individuals allocate both time
and effort between market and non-market
activities; and since women allocate more
effort to home activities, they have less effort
(relative to men) to allocate to work. Thus,
women are less productive and should be paid
accordingly (cited in Bielby). Following this
line of reasoning, some argue that women
cannot "hack it" in the more "demanding"
53

areas of law, such as litigation.
Bielby (1991) offers several alternative
explanations for women being just as
productive as men in the workplace even
though they allocate more time to non-market,
home activities: 1) some men choose not to
draw on reserve stockpiles of effort, 2)
physiological evidence supports the notion that
humans have renewable energy sources--being
active is stimulating, 3) as in Becker's theory,
'sex roles are taken for granted, and 4) the
allocation of work effort may not be a
deliberate or conscious choice.
Blau and Ferber also cast a shadow of
doubt on Becker's Neoclassical theory. They
point out that mentor-protege relationships are
usually initiated by the - experienced...
professional; if a field's senior members are
mostly male, as is the case with law, a large
majority of mentors will be male. Male
mentors tend to choose male proteges. While
no economic theory specifically explains why
this happens, it has been suggested that male
mentors feel uncomfortable and "unable to
relate" to female proteges. Also, wives and
colleagues may pressure them not to have
female proteges (BlaulFerber). Similar to the
influence of consumers' tastes for
discrimination, a non-discriminating mentor
may be forced to act discriminatingly. Thus,
males are favored as proteges and gain a
human capital advantage. Specifically Michael 
J. Howlett Jr., a partner in a Chicago law firm,
a former associate judge and special deputy .
outside counsel for the United States House of
Representatives Ethics Committee (1988-89),
points out that "Not enough of what we do
generally in the practice of law is focused on
how to mentor women associates. ...That is
where I see a continuing glass ceiling or
barrier (ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 25)".
Research by Baron, et at suggests that
when decision makers (employers) change
more frequently and/or are younger, the
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chance ofincreasing the position offemales in
the labor queue (ranking) is greater. Such
industries are expected to integrate more
rapidly (cited in Reskin). Law is not one such
industry. In fact, some criticize it for being
patriarchal (Epstein 1981, p. 111). This also
supports the preceding BlaulFerber argument.

beliefs become reality the practice is not
discriminatory. However, research by Viscusi,
Blau and Kahn revealed that this does not
seem to be the case--men and women have
equal turnover rates, ceteris paribus (Olson
and Becker 1983, p. 627). Therefore,
segregating male and female lawyers by area of
practice or job assignment fits the strict
definition of discrimination if employers make
stereotypes based on erroneous information; it
is a case of "irrational expectations".
· One other thing to consider when dealing
with statistical discrimination is how it affects
the employment decisions of the stereotyped
group. Statistical discrimination may have
feedback effects. These effects include actions '
and/or reactions of discriminated-against
individuals that are influenced by the
knowledge that they are indeed discriminated
against; the result is a self-fulfilling prophesy
(BlaulFerber, pp. 208-10). For example, a
female entering the legal profession may want
to specialize in litigation. However, during an
internship she leams that women .have few
opportunities for advancement in litigation
firms. In order to avoid being trapped in a
dead-end job, the female decides to specialize
in public interest law. On the surface this
decision reinforces the stereotypes that women
are not tough enough to make it in litigation
and that they are "soft-hearted". But, this
surface analysis reverses the causation-which
came first, the chicken or the egg?

B. STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION
On the other hand, it is possible that
discrimination is not just the result of
discriminatory "tastes" or human capital
choice. Instead it may be the result of a"
market failure, namely imperfect inforination.
The model of statistical discrimination assumes
that employers and/or consumers face
imperfect infomiation and uncertainty
regarding individuals' potential productivity.
AS they make hiring or promotional decisions,
employers project their "average" beliefs about
a.particular group onto an individual applicant
who belongs to that particular group. As a
result, individuals are discriminated against
because they (the applicants) are believed to
share
some
undesirable
stereotypic
characteristic.
While it may seem
contradictory, if on average an employer's
stereotypic views are proven correct, the
resulting decisions are not discriminatory
under a strict definition of discrilnination
(BlaulFerber, pp. 208-10). The actual result
remains the same--some qualified applicants
are erroneously excluded from employment.
Overcrowding theory would predict that
the imperfect information decreases demand
for female lawyers. Employers may believe
that females do not have as high of an
expected employment life as do their male
counterparts and decide not to grant females
the same opportunities of firm-specific
training, job assignments or promotion that
they offer to males. It: on average, these

The Park Place Economist v.3

IlL PREVIOUS RESEARCH:
Until now most of the literature and
research has focused explicitly on the theory of
wage differentials. A study by Craig A. Olson
and Brian E. Becker took a different approach
and examined the effect of gender on
promotion and the returns to promotion
(1983). Olson and Becker predicted the
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fundamentally different promotion processes,
Olson and Becker stated that:
[U]nequal access to opportunities,
rather than unequal returns, constitutes
the principal source of male-female
differences in employment outcomes

probability of promotion for men and women
across all occupations during the years of
1973-77, using data from the Quality of
Employment PaneL 1973-77. Out of an
original sample of 1455 individuals who were
over the age of 16 and working more than 20
hours per week, they used 408 individuals.
The restricted sample excluded individuals
whose data was incomplete as well as those
who were either self-employed or had left their
previous employer in 1973 (neither group had
opportunities for promotion within the same
firm for the years between 1973-1977).
After explanations of promotions, wages
and sample attrition, Olson and Becker
constructed a three-equation model. The
promotion equation captured both observable
and unobservable components of expected
performance.
After
controlling
for
occupation, education, tenure, labor force
experience, union status, firm size, attrition,
marital status, and region ofemployment, men
and women do have significant differences in
promotion. A gender variable revealed that
being female ·decreased the likelihood of
promotion; and even when they are promoted,
women receive promotions ofless significance.
These different and unequal promotional paths
result in job segregation.
After examining the impact that the
promotion process had on wage differentials,
they revealed that:
[O]ur results indicate that women
(men) would have received substantially
more (fewer) promotions had they
been held to the same standards as men
(women). Although the female-male
wage gap narrowed by about 6 percent
between 1973 and 1977, it would have
narrowed even further--by 8.6 to 9.2
percent--ifmen and women had been
promoted on the basis of the same
criteria (p. 641).
Concluding that men and women face

(p.641).

These findings
support
Bergmann's
overcrowding hypothesis.
The theoretical implication of Bergmann
also seems to be supported by a recent study
that was conducted by Dr. David N. Laband
and Dr. Bernard F. Lentz. In their study ofthe
legal profession, they used a LOGIT
regression to test the probability of an attorney
achieving partnership.
Probability of
partnership was a positive and significant 
function of experience and law school
performance (p. 232). Using a dummy
variable for gender, they received a
significantly negative coefficient for female.
However, controlling for family status
decreased the significance and the value ofthe
.variable. Finding that an individual's role in
the family is more important than gender in
predicting partnership, they concluded that
there was no sex discrimination. However,
another possibility is· that feedback effects are
responsible for determining family status as
well as type of practice. Laband and Lentz
also examined wage differentials and
promotion possibilities for female and male
lawyers. No significant differences appeared.
Furthermore, they used job-description
variables as a means of testing for covert
discrimination. Subjective ratings of potential
for advancement, work atmosphere, level of
responsibility, and office politics served as
proxies for covert discrimination. Using OLS
regression analysis, Laband and Lentz found
that negative or low job description ratings
were more significant for females than males.
They concluded that "sex discrimination
against women in the legal profession is a
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charge sustained by little tangible but much
intangible evidence" (Laband 1993, p. 253).
Laband's and Lentz's results offer empirical
support for the predictions of Bergmann's
overcrowding theory--wage differentials do
not exist on a same-job basis, but females and
males do appear to have different roles within
the legal community. Additionally, the
"intangible margins" may possibly be explained
by statistical discrimination. Perhaps feedback
effects are responsible for detennining family
status as well as type of practice.
They also tried to detennine whether or
not female attorneys either self-selected
(feedback effects) or were channeled into
certain areas of practice (Laband, 248). Using
a multivariate approach, Laband and Lentz ran
"regression models ofthe detenninants oftime
allocations to 16 subfields of law (Laband,
248)." Forty-three explanatory variables were
identified, and the regression was run on 1984
data for 427 associate lawyers. Their results
found "virtually no evidence of gender-based
differences with respect to the self-reported
percent of time respondents spent on various
types of law (248)". Even though their results
were not significant, it is interesting to note
that for certain areas, the female coefficient
was negative. These areas include: antitrust,
labor/employment,
natural
resources,
patent/trademark/copyright, public utility and
tortslinsurance law.

2) separate labor markets for male and female
lawyers exist in the form ofjob segregation by
type oflaw practiced (area of concentration);
3) male and female lawyers are segregated
with respect to position within the firm.
These hypotheses will be tested using
descriptive statistics, cross-tab analysis as well
as OLS and LOGIT regression analysis. While
two sets of data will be used to test the
hypotheses, both data sources will incorporate
some of the variables included in the Laband
and Lentz research.

Does crowding exist?
A. WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
1. Model

One of the indirect implications of
Bergmann's model is that wage differentials
develop between the discriminated against
(female) and the preferred (male) segments of
a specific labor market (legal labor market). A··
sample of 45 legal professionals (21 females
and 24 males), obtained from the National
Longitudinal Survey ofYouth (NLSy), will be
used to test this hypothesis. The NLSY
database contains information on 12,686
individuals; this data was collected by·means
of annual personal interviews conducted by
U.s. Census personnel between the years of'
1979 and 1990 (Center for Human Resources,
1992). Due to the time period covered by the
NLSY, this sample consists ofrelatively young
lawyers.
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
analysis will be used to test for statistically
significant differences in annual wage income
between male and female lawyers. As implied
by Bergmann's theory, it is expected that being
female has a negative effect on the amount of
an individual's wages/salary because women
are "crowded" into lower paying jobs. A
dummy variable for gender (1 =female;

IV. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES:

This study uses Dr. Bergmann's
overcrowding hypothesis as a theoretical
framework with which to extend the work of
Laband and Lentz. Bergmann's theory
suggests the following hypotheses:
1) crowding in the legal labor market leads to
wage differentials between male and female
lawyers;
The Park Place Economist v.3
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O=male) is predicted to have a significant and
negative coefficient. In order to better explain
differences in wages/salary, I will try to control
for work experience using proxy variables--the
number of hours worked during the 1991
calendar year (HOURS) and age (AGE). As
the number of hours worked (age) increases,
so should the wages/salary. Positive and
significant signs are expected.
Furthermore, the NLSY divides marital
status into three groups: never married,
married with spouse present, and other. For
the purposes ofthis study, the variables will be
recoded into a dummy variable: MARRIED
equals 1 if the respondent is married with
hislher spouse present, and 0 if otherwise.
Human capital theory indicates that marriage
can impact the number of hours an individual
devotes to the workplace. It may increase the
number of hours worked as the individual
substitutes leisure time for an increase in
income. This may occur if the individual is the
principal wage earner for a family. On the
other hand, marriage may result in a decrease
in hours worked as the individual substitutes
away from work and towards time spent in
non-labor market activities. In this case, the
individual values time spent out of the labor
market more than he/she values participation
in the professional workplace. This study will
use the marriage dummy variable as a control
variable. Comparisons will be made with the
results ofLaband and Lentz.

respondent's annual wages/salary for the 1991
calendar year.

Unequal
access
to
opportunity, rather than
unequal returns, constitutes
the principal source of male
female
differences
in
employment outcomes.
Unlike the results ofLaband and Lentz, all
three· models have a significantly negative
coefficient for the -.female gender variable
(FEMALE). This supports the hypothesis
implied in Bergmann's theory: crowding in the
legal labor market does lead to wage
differentials between males and females.
Specifically, in Model C being female reduces
a lawyers annual wages/salary by 516,539.18,
ceteris paribus (See Table 2). What's more,
AGE is the most significant ofthe proxies for
experience-in Model C, one additional year of
experience brings about. an increase of
54603.42 in the individual's annual
wages/salary. HOURS worked and marital
status (MARRIED) do not have significant
effects on an individuals earnings.
. The insignificance of the marital status
variable is noteworthy because of its
relationship with the results of Laband and
Lentz's research. In order to approach the
problem in a manner closer to that used by
Laband and Lentz, who included family status
variables [number of children and marital
status] (237), an interaction variable was
created between gender and marital status
(FEMMARRY). Even though Laband and
Lentz found no significant difference between
gender and family status, a recent sUlVey

2. Results
OLS regression results are listed in Table 1
(see next page). Model A includes all ofthe
variables: hours worked, gender, marital
status, and age. Model B does not control for
marital status. And, Model C is a simple
regression with age and gender for
independent variables. In all three models, the
dependent variable is the amount of the
57

Table 1: OLS regression: Dependent variable--Annual wages/salary (1991).
T-statistics are given in parentheses.
Significance: *=.10 **=.05 ***=.01
Independent
Variable:
Model A
ModelB
Model C
FEMALE
-17129.87
-17605.91
-16539.18
(-1.729 *)

(-1.802 *)

AGE

4478.46
(1.938 *)

4210.44
(1.878 *)

HOURS

4.71
( .566 )

6.17
(.801 )

MARRIED

5935.52
(.590 )

constant
adj R2
Model F-stat

-91103.52
.128
2.25 *
34

n

-83216.07
.147
2.95 **
34

conducted by The National Law Journal found
that, "...more than six out of 10 women,
compared with just two in 10 men, said that
their careers have suffered in relation to their
colleagues whose 'significant others' do not
work full time....--if only because, as the
respondents agree, women have primary
responsibility for the children" (1993). This
study agreed with The National Law Journal,
and as is consistent with the previous
discussion of labor market participation,
expected that being female and married has a
negative effect on wages/salary. This was not
the case; when FEMMARRY was included
in regression analysis, it was not significant. It
seems that marriage does not significantly
affect wages/salary. On the other hand, it may
be that the young ages of the NLSY
respondents biases these results.
Future research may shed some additional
light on the detennination ofwagesisalaries by
The .Park Place Economist v.3

(-1.720 *)
4603.42
( 2.119 **)

-81856.67
.157
4.17 **
34

including variables for different areas of
concentration, firm size and urban/rural
locations. These may also play a part through
supply and demand as well as cost of living
mechanisms.
How is crowding manifested?
Data from the Martindale-Hubbell Law
DirectOI}' (1992), a"state-by-state compilation
of professional biographies for lawyers in
private practice, was coded to create variables
that represent areas of concentration, position
with current employer, firm size, geographic
location, and educational background. Four
hundred lawyers, two hundred females (an
over-representation), and two hundred males,
were· randomly selected from all fifty states.
The exclusion ofin-house corporate attorneys
and those employed by the goyernment is
likely to bias my results, particularly because
58
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Table 2:

ESTIMATED SALARIES
(based on OLS results--MODEL C)
80
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female lawyers are expected to be
disproportionately represented in these sectors
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 19). Even so, this data
makes it easier to compare my results to those
of Laband and Lentz. It is possible that the
MDH data will provide more reliable results
because the sample is representative of the
national population of lawyers.
-

estate/probate and tax law (Epstein, 102). As
was previously mentioned, female lawyers are
expected to be disproportionately represented
in corporate in-house legal operations
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 19). Similarly, this
study anticipates that females are also over
represented in corporate/finance practice.
Unlike the previous areas of concentration,
criminal practice does not involve typically
"female" topics.
Instead, it has been
hypothesized that female lawyers may have a
significant presence in this area of practice
because criminal law is viewed as the "lowest
form of courtroom work" (Epstein, 1"06).
Research by Laband and Lentz offers empirical
support for these predictions; even though the
coefficients were not statistically significant,...
the above-mentioned areas of concentration
were positively related to a female dummy
variable (p. 249).
On the other hand, fewer women are
expected to spend a significant amount oftime
working on cases in the following areas:
litigation and appellate work [LIT-APPEl,
labor/employment
law
[LABOR],
environmental concerns [ENVIR] and
copyrightlpatentfmtellectual property law
[pATENT]. Presumably litigation and
appellate work is viewed as an area of
concentration requiring typically "male virtues"
that result in a confident and aggressive
courtroom presence (ROUNDTABLE 2, p.
24). Clients and decision makers inside firms
do not expect as good results from a female
lawyer as they do from a male. Furthermore,
female attorneys with these attributes may
actually be looked down upon if they do
exhibit such qualities:
If they are tough in the courtroom,
then they are not pleasant to work
with as a partner. And if they are
not tough in the courtroom, then they
are a lovely person to work with,

A: OCCUPATIONAL CROWDING
1. Model

Descriptive statistics and cross-tabs will be
used to examine the distribution oflawyers in
certain areas ofpractice. Firm size will also be
examined because certain types of law may be
more likely to be practiced in large firms.
Also, a greater proportion of female lawyers
are expected to work in small firms or solo
practices--this seems to have been the general
trend, with female lawyers reporting greater
responsibility and a greater chance of
partnership in such firms (Deakin,' 1993).
Proof for crowding will include significant
gender differences among occupational
distributions by specialty. Whereas the NLSY
analysis will provide indirect evidence of
possible crowding in the legal labor market,
the MDH analysis will provide insight into the
specific ways in which crowding may be
manifested.
Theory as well as personal accounts offered
by the ROUNDTABLE participants predict
that female lawyers concentrate their practices
in the areas of general/family practice [GP
FAM], corporate/finance law [CORP-FIN],
estate/probate and tax law [EST-TAX] and
criminal law [CRIM]. Societal stereotypes
have long cast women in nurturing and
caretaking roles--charaeteristics that are
thought to be indicative offamily law (Epstein,
102). Similar reasoning may explain the overrepresentation of females in the practice of
The Park Place Economist v.3
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but nobody would want to be
represented by them in court
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 26).
As mentioned earlier, labor and
employment law tends to be male-dominated
because the leadership oflabor unions tends to
be male-dominated. Recently, participation by
female lawyers has been increasing, but only
slowly (ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 28). As for the
ENVIR and PATENT classifications, males
may be more dominant in these areas of
concentration because of the scientific
component--science has long been a
stereotypically "male" field of study. Laband
and Lentz found negative coefficients for their
female dummy variable when it was regressed
against these four areas (p. 249). My study
maintains these predictions.
The areas of civil practice [CIVIL],
malpractice law [MAL], personal injury and
workers' compensation law [PI], international
practice [INTL], and insurance defense
practice [INSDEF] are uncertain. First, the
area of civil practice is very broad. It also
includes a mixture offunctions some-ofwhich
. are traditionally thought of as "male" or
"female". Second, the areas of malpractice,
personal injury, and insurance defense are
highly specialized areas of concentration
lawyers may not report these specific areas as
the focus of their practices. Furthermore,
these areas often involve specialized medical
and business components. As mentioned
earlier, males are more traditionally found in
areas dealing with medicine, and females are
expected to be found in areas dealing with
corporate/finance matters. It is hard to tell
which subject area will dominate and even
harder to tell whether or not lawyers of a
particular gender will dominate these areas of
practice. For these reasons no predictions are
made.

2. Results
Generally, tests for "gender" crowding by
area of concentration were consistent with
those of previous research; there was no
significant evidence of crowding. Individual
cross-tabs were run between the FEMALE
variable and each area of concentration.
Results are reported in Table 3 (see next
page). As forecast by theory and the Laband
and Lentz research, the areas of corporate
finance and general-family practice did contain
a larger percentage of women. While the
difference was not significant in the corporate
finance area, it was significant at the .10 level
for the area of general-family law. Criminal
and estate-tax practices had been hypothesized·
to be significantly female areas of
concentration, but those areas were
numerically dominated by males (70.6% male
and 56.7% male, respectively).
Ofthe areas that were hypothesized to be
predominately male, only litigation-appellate
law contained a larger percentage of men than
women; the difference was not statistically
significant. Contrary to prediction, the areas of
environmental, labor and patent law had more
women than men. Again, the differences were
not statistically significant. Perhaps these
differences are due to a combination of an
increase in young female attorneys that have
entered the job market recently and the
increase in demand for lawyers in areas like
environmental, labor and patent law
(USN&WR, p. 110).
Surprisingly, the area of concentration
with the greatest significant difference between
male and female lawyers was one that had no
previous prediction--personal injury and
workers' compensation [PI]. Reporting a
composition of 72.4% males and 27.6%
females, it was significant at the .05 level.
Perhaps the medical content and often litigious
nature ofthis type of practice has generally
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Table 3: Cross-tabs. FEMALE and AREA(s) OF CONCENTRATION

AREA OF
CONCENTRATION

EXPECTED
DOMINANCE % MALE

Clll% FEMALE SQUARE

CIVIL

(166)

?

50.0

50.0

.0000

CORP-FIN

(209)

F

49.3

50.7

.0401

CRIM

( 17)

F

70.6

29.4

2.2116

ENVIR

( 19)

M

42.1

57.9

.2210

EST-TAX

( 60)

F

56.7

43.3

.9608

GP-FAM

( 95)

F

42.1

57.9

2.7058*

INSDEF

( 13)

?

46.2

53.8

.0000

INTL

( 15)

?

46.7

53.3

.0000

LABOR

( 14)

M

42.9

57.1

.0740

LIT-APPE . (129)

M

51.9

48.1

.1831

MAL

( 8)

?

50.0

50.0

.0000

PATENT

( 10)

M

30.0

70.0

.9231

(29)

?

72.4

27.6

5.3537**

.PI

-parentheses contain the number of sample lawyers indicating a concentration in the specified
area; total number does not equal 800 because some lawyers only listed one area of concentration
n =400

* = significant at .10 level
** = significant at .05 level

discouraged women from entering, or has
otherwise kept them out ofthis area. Another
possibility is that this type of practice requires
a significant amount of experience, and the
majority of female lawyers have not been
practicing long enough to get the experience
The Park Place Economist v.3

that is necessary to specialize in this area.
Overall statistically significant support of
the crowding hypothesis on the basis of area of
concentration is weak. Apparently male and
female lawyers are not significantly segregated
into different areas ofconcentration. However,
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other hand, the results for the female
dominated area of international law do not
uphold this hypothesis. 46.790A» of those with
a concentration in international law were
found to be in smalVmedium firms and 53.3%
were in large firms; this was significant at the
.01 level. Again, no concrete conclusions can
be drawn. It may be that firm size plays a role
in det~g partnership status (Deakin), but
not in determining area(s) of concentration.
This will be examined in the next section.

complications with the MDH data may have
influenced the results. The subjective nature
used to report an individual's areas of
concentration poses two potential problems.
First, in addition to being a reference source,
the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory can
also be used as an advertising device. As such,
firms and individuals may try to maximize the
probability of getting ~ew business by being
very general in describing their practices. Or,
finns and individuals wishing to increase their
caseload in a particular area of practice may be
very specific in describing their practices.
Second, whether or not an individual declares
a particular area of concentration depends in
part on how he/she defines that particular
specialty. For example, what one individual
considers to be a civil practice may be
considered by another to be a general-family
practice. Perhaps these data complications
have biased my results.
Another possibility: certain areas of
concentration are more likely to be practiced
in large finns. Iffemale lawyers are, as Deakin
(1993) suggests, more likely to practice in
smaller finns, then they may also be less likely
to specialize in these areas. To test for possible
indirect effects of firm size on area of
concentration, fum size variables were recoded
to create BIGFIRM, a· dummy variable that
indicated firms having 60 or more attorneys.
Cross-tabs of BIGFIRM with each area of
concentration and with FEMALE produced
mixed results. Only three areas of
concentration had significant differences
between large and smalVmedium firms. Ofthe
lawyers concentrating in the area of general
family practice, 72.6% worked in small or
medium firms and 27.4% worked in large
firms, at the .05 level of significance.
Considered together with the cross-tabs
between FEMALE and general-family
practice, this appears to be consistent with
Deakin as well as Laband and Lentz. On the

B: PARTNERSHIP
1. Model

In addition to exanunmg areas, of
concentration, the MDH data will be used'to
examine a lawyers position within the firm.
Division of labor within a law firm occurs
between partner and associate levels.
Generally, partnership status is determined
after 7 1/2 to 9 1/2 years with a firm
(ROUNDTABLE 1, p. 17); it has been
determined that after ten year~, .S90A» of males
and only 23% of females become partners
(ROUNDTABLE 3, p. 15). If "gender"
crowding is present, it is expected tha~ cross
tabs and regression analysis will reveal a
statistical significance on the basis ofgender.
Specifically, a negative relationship is expected
between partnership and a female dummy
variable (l=female; O=male).
Theoretically, the probability of a lawyer
achieving partnership status depends on human
capital investment, experience and other
criteria:
PARTNER =f(HUMCAP, EXPERIENCE,
OTHER)
The actual variables to be used in this study

are presented in Table 4 (see next page).
Human capital influences include law school
prestige [TOPQUART, 2ndQUART,
3rdQUART], law school performance
[HONORS], law review experience [REV],
63

Table 4: Determinants ofPartnership
VARIABLE

DEFINITION

PARTNER

Partnership status; (1 = partner; 0 = otherwise)

FEMALE

Gender identified as female; (1 = female; 0 = male)

EXP
EXPSQ

Experience; 92-BAR, with BAR = year offirst admittance to bar
EXP *EXP

FS-l
FS-2
F8-3
FS-4
FS-S
FS-6
FS-7
BIGFIRM
TOPQUART
2ndQUART
3rdQUART
HONORS

Firm consists of2-3 lawyers; (1 = finn size of2-3; 0 = otherwise)
Firm consists of4-9 lawyers; (1 = firm size of 4-9; 0 = otherwise)
Firm consists of 10-20 lawyers; (1 = firm size of 10-20; 0 = otherwise)
Firm consists of21-30 lawyers; (1 = firm size of21-30; 0 = otherwise)
Finn consists of31-60 lawyers; (1 = firm size of31-60; 0 = otherwise)
Finn consists of61-90 lawyers; (1 = firm size of61-90; 0 = otherwise)
Firm consists of 90+ lawyers; (1 = firm size of 90+; 0 = otherwise)
Firm consists of 60+ lawyers; (1 =firm size of 60+; 0 = otherwise)
Law school is ranked in top quartile; (1 = top; 0 = otherwise)
Law school is ranked in second quartile; (1 = second; 0 = otherwise)
Law school is ranked in third quartile; (1 = third; 0 = otherwise)
Graduated law school with honors; (1 = honors; 0 = otherwise)
Worked on law r~view during law school; (1 = review; 0 = otherwise)
Worked as law clerk during law school or the year following the completion
of law school; (1 = clerk; 0 = otherwise)
Practicing in Western geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
Practicing in Midwestern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
Practicing in Southern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)
Practicing in the Northern geographic region; (1 = yes; 0 = otherwise)

REV
CLERK
WEST
MIDWEST
SOUTH
NORTH

and clerkship experience [CLERK].
Experience is measured as the number ofyears
in practice [EXP]. To account for the
likelihood of partnership status increasing at a
decreasing rate with respect to experience,
EXPSQ will also be included. Finally, gender
[FEMALE], finn size [FS-l, FS-2, FS-3, FS
4, FS-S, FS-6, FS-7 and BIGFIRM], and
geographical location [WEST, MIDWEST,
NORTH, SOUTH] are included.
Law review experience and any extra

are included because oftheir voluntary nature;
the individual law student actively chooses to
participate in these activities as a way
enhancing hislher future performance. This
additional general training is expected to be
positively related to partnership.
This study uses law school prestige, as
determined by the U.S. News & World
Report's quartile ranking of the nation's law
schools. It is expected that going to a more
prestigious law school will enhance an

curricular events that a lawyer participates in

individual's chance of making partner. These
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results will be compared to those of Laband
and Lentz. Instead of using an established
system for ranking law school, Laband and
Lentz relied on the respondents' subjective
opinions as to whether their law schools were
"very prestigious", "somewhat prestigious",
"not very prestigious" or "not prestigious" (p.
256).. Thus, the results achieved using the law
school ranking and ~H'data are expected to
be more reliable.

can affect a lawyer's chance of becoming a
partner. Their results indicate that a greater
probability of partnership exists in smaller
firms (p. 238), a finding that is consistent with
current trends as identified by Deakin (1993).
This study tests the same hypotheses.
Geographic location may also influence
partnership. As the National Law 10umal
West Publishing ·Company survey results
revealed, "[g]enerally, more women in Los
Angeles and Washington said they felt their·
firms provided equal opportunities than did
women in Boston or Chicago (Lewin, p. 15)".
Regional differences were also reported
regarding the complications that female
lawyers face because of male-only clubs
(Lewin, p. 15).
While this study was limited by data, the
literature discusses other variables that might
affect the likelihood ofbecoming a partner. In
future research, it might be helpful to evaluate
the effects that the following variables have on
partnership: years with firm, full- or part-time
employment, billable hours, ability to bring in
business, as well as sociological variables such
as race, marital status, and number ofkids.
Since the ability to bring in business and
billable hours are often used as important
measures of productivity, they are also taken
into account as a firm's management is making
decisions regarding partnership. A positive
relationship would be predicted. Race, marital
status, and number of children may affect an
individual's probability ofbeing partner. Race
would be expected to have a negative effect if
the individual is a minority. Furthermore,
marital status and number of children may
indirectly affect an individual's tastes
for/against hours spent in the workplace (See
the discussion of work-force participation).
Interaction variables between these variables
and gender might also produce interesting
results with respect to predicting partnership
status.

Clients and decision makers
iriside firms do not expect as
good of results from a female
lawyer as they do from a
male.
Years in practice (EXP) are expected to
be significantly and positively related to
partnership status. HQwever, EXPSQ is
expected to have negative and significant
coefficient.· This would indicate that the
positive effect of experience on partnership
increases at a decreasing rate--as an individual
spends more time with a firm in the capacity of
a non-partner, the likelihood of becoming a
. partner increases at a slower rate. Eventually
a leveling off occurs.
The following variables have an effect on
partnership: years with present employer
(firm), full- or part-time employment, billable
hours, ability to bring in business, on-the-job
extras as well as sociological variables such as
race, marital status, and number of children.
The first two are direct quantitative measures
of experience and are traditionally positively
related to partnership.
Likelihood of
becoming a partner is positively related to full
time employment, but negatively related to
part-time status (Lewin, p. 15).
Laband and Lentz suggest that firm size
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and the human capital variables of HONORS,
REV and CLERK are removed. Model C
evaluates the effects of gender (FEMALE),
experience (EXP and EXPSQ) and law school
rank (TOPQUART) on partnership. These

2. Results

To begin assessing the relationship between
gender and status within the firm, I eliminated
solo practitioners because they have no
opportunity for further advancement. In o~der
to accurately account for the fact that
partnership is generally granted between 7 ~
and 9 ~ years (ROUNDTABLE 1, . p. 17), and
to eliminate outliers that were detected by the
cross-tabs analysis, I decided to further restrict
the sample to those lawyers with between 6
and 20 years of experience. This reduces the
sample size to 226 (99 males and 127
females). Only results obtained using the
restricted sample will be reported here.
ai-variate cross-tab analysis between
FEMALE and PARTNER did reveal a
significant relationship. Referring to Table 5
(see next page), 74.7% ofthe male lawyers are
partners, compared to 57.7% of the female
lawyers. The difference is significant at the .01
level.
In hopes of better understanding the
magnitude .of the relationship, I switched to
multi-variate regression analysis. LOGIT
analysis was chosen because of the
dichotomous
dependent
. variable
(PARTNER). Unlike OLS regression analysis,
.the LOGIT coefficients cannot be treated like
probability values. However, the signs and
significance ofthe coefficients can be analyzed
in much the same way as they are in OLS.
LOGIT results are presented in Table 6.
Model A, the complete mode~ includes all
of the variables that are expected to effect
partnership status. In Model B, the firm size
variables are recoded into the dummy variable
BIGFIRM; only the law school variable of
TOPQUART remains; variables indicating an
individual's geographic location are eliminated;
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Generally, more women in
Los
Angeles
and
Washington said they felt
their law firms provided
equal opportunities than did
women

in

Boston

or

Chicago.
changes and individual results will be discussed
later.
In general these results support the
crowding hypothesis-male and female lawyers
are segregated with respect to position within
the firm, ceteris paribus. FEMALE has the
expected negative sign, and it is a statistically
significant predictor ofpartnership status. This
relationship is maintained even after
controlling for geographical location, firm size,
experience and human capital influences.
As is consistent with human capital theory and
the findings of Laband and Lentz, both EXP
and EXPSQ are extremely significant.
Model A also reveals that law school,
geographic region and other human capital
measures (HONORS, REV and CLERK) do
not significantly affect the prediction of
. partnership status. In order to conselVe
degrees of freedom, Model B drops several
insignificant variables. These include sets of
dummy variables for finn size, human capital
investment and geographic location. Before
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Table 5:

PARTNERSHIP STATUS BY GENDER
(restricted sample)

100
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II MALE II FEMALE
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they were dropped, the groups of variables
were tested to see it: as groups, they
significantly affected the prediction power of
the equation. The significance ofthe changes
in chi-square and the degrees of freedom were
No statistically significant
evaluated.
differences were found.
The relative insignificance of the human
capital variables leads me to believe that once _
a lawyer'is hired, he/she is viewed as an equal
among hislher peers. Although general
training may be responsible for getting the job,
there is no evidence in these results that the
general training helps a lawyer achieve
partnership. Perhaps firm-specific training is
more important. This finding would offer
support for the results of the National Law
Journal-West Publishing Company survey and
the BlaulFerber research. Unfortunately, there
is no way for me to directly test this
hypothesis.
Of the three dummy variables which
capture the quality of law school, only
TOPQUART was retained in Model B. This
was done to maintain the theoretical integrity
ofthe model. Furthermore, it is possible that
the ranked "quality" of the law school affects
future performance more than the individual's
performance in law school. TOPQUART is
significant at the .05 level in Model B and the
.01 level in Model C.
With the exception of FS-6, none of the
firm size variables are significant. This is
consistent with preliminary cross-tab analysis
ofpartner and firm size, controlling for gender.
Since firm size was implicated as an important
determinant of partnership by Laband and
Lentz as well as Deakin, and because FS-6
was significant at the .10 level, a dummy
variable (BIGFIRM) that indicates firms with
60 or more attorneys was added to the
equation. Unlike the previous predictions,
BIGFIRM is not statistically significant.
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So, what do the LOGIT results reveal
about "gender" crowding by position within
the law firm? One' way to answer this question
more definitively is to see the LOGIT
cumulative distribution function and the
estimated LOGIT coefficients to test the
accuracy ofprediction for Model C. For each
of the 226 lawyers, an estimated probability
was calculated. A probability of more than
(less than) .50 is a prediction of being a
partner (non-partner). Accordingly, Model C
has an error rate of27%, with 44 Type I errors
.
and 17 Type IT errors.
In order to make specific estimates
regarding the probability of being a partner,
the independent variables must be assigned
definite values~ For example, assume that the
respondent has 10 years of experience (EXP =
10 and EXPSQ = 100) and went to a top
quartile law school (TOPQUART = 1).
Using the logistic cumulative distribution
function, it is estimated1hat a male lawyer has
a 63. 1% probability of being a partner; .a
female with -the same qualifications has an
estimated probability of 48.7%. Model C
predicts that the male is a partner, while the
female is not. Being'female apparently.reduces
a lawyer's chances' of being a partner by 14.4
percentage points, ceteris paribus. When
other assumptions are made regarding the
values of the independent variables, the
computed gender differences are similar. The
effect is generally around 12 percentage
points. As Bergmann's crowding hypothesis
suggests, male and female lawyers are
segregated according to position within the

firm.
On an interesting side note, the control
variable
for
law
school
prestige,
TOPQUART, has a highly significant impact_
on the probability of becoming a partner for
both males and females. Using the same
assumptions from above, a male (female) who
had not gone to a top quartile law school

financial
support
or
considerable
discrimination, females may choose to enroll in
less prestigious schools. As manifestations of .'
statistical discrimination, these feedback
effects reinforce the stereotype that female law
students are not as smart or as tough as their
male counterparts (Epstein, 1981).
Thus, the cross-tab analysis and
TOPQUARTs significance indicate that self
segregation into a less prestigious law school,
as a result of feedback effects, may adversely
affect the female lawyer's quest for
partnership. This is not direct, but indirect in
that it gives the male who graduated froin a
prestigious school an advantage.

would have an estimated probability of 43.5%
(30.0%). The probability of being a partner
decreases by nearly 20 percentage points!
While this study was not able to identify
the interaction effects between gender and law
school prestige, cross-tab analysis of the law
school variables with FEMALE indicated that
males were significantly more likely
graduate from a law school in the top quartile
(X2 = 3.646**). On the other hand, females
were more likely to graduate from a law
school in the third quartile (X2 = 6.396***).
These results are similar to those of Laband
and Lentz, who found more males in the top
halt: and more females in the bottom half (p.

to

256).

Attitudes-origins of crowding?
1. Model

The relative insignificance
of the human capital
variables leads me to believe
that once a lawyer is hired,
he/she.is viewed as an equal
among-his/her peers.


In an attempt to uncover the origins of
crowding--what causes the negative sign on
the FEMALE variable in the preceding
analyses--a set of attitudinal responses from
the NLSY was evaluated. Eleven questions
were asked about control, self-esteem, and
family attitudes. It is expected that male
respondents are more likely than their female
counterparts to feel a sense of control ·over
their actions and the directions that their lives
are taking (attitudes of control and self~
esteem). Also, it is expected that males ar~
more likely to favor traditional roles for
females within the family unit (family
attitudes). However, it is not clear if this
difference will be statistically significant.
Uncertainty arises because the sample is small
and because the sample is composed ofyoung
attomeys--a group that has, in general, been
exposed to greater gender equality in both the
home and educational environment.
Therefore, it is not immediately apparent what
significance the differences will have on the
regression results.

I can think oftwo instances in which such
law school segregation, might occur. First,
gender discrimination on the part of admission
committees at law schools may give male
students an advantage. This would be an
example of the direct effects of statistical
discrimination (imperfect information). Or,
self-segregation and feedback effects may lead
women to enroll in less prestigious schools.
Conditions that might influence feedback
effects include parental and societal pressures
as well as the knowledge that, until recently,
many of the prestigious law schools were
actively opposed to enrolling female students
(Epstein, p. 50). Fearing disapproval, lack of
The Park Place Economist v.3
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2. Results

Overall males and females did not differ
significantly with respect to attitudes of
control. As a group, the young lawyers felt •
that they were in control of their plans from
beginning to end. However, the results on
self-esteem
statements were mixed.
Surprisingly, 100% of the females responded
that they disagree/strongly disagree with the
following statements: 1) "I feel that I am a
person ofworth, at least on an equal basis with
others", and 2) "I am able to do things ~ well
as most other people". Cross-tab analysis
found that these differences, with respect to
gender, were significant withj2 = 2.81*.
This implies that feedback effects may
indirectly play a strong role in the decisions of
these young female lawyers. The societal
forces that shape these females' sense of self
esteem may direct choices regarding law
schooL area ofconcentration, firm size as well
as many other career-related decisions.
On the other hand, cross-tab analysis of
family attitudes and gender provide different
conclusions. The following statements had a
significant number of males agreeing/strongly
agreeing with them: 1) "A woman's place is
in the home, not in the office or shop", and 2)
"A wife who carries out her full family
responsibilities doesn't have time for outside
employment".
The differences were
significant withj2 = 2.81 * andj2 =
6.06***, respectively. While the presence of
a statistically significant difference is
somewhat discouraging, a closer examination
is needed. For both statements 100% of the
females disagreed/strongly disagreed; 87.5%
(75.0%) of the male respondents disagreed
/strongly disagreed with statement 1. This
leaves only 12.5% (25.0%) ofthe males who
agreed/strongly agreed with the statements.
The relatively low percentages of males
agreeing with these statements is encouraging.
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Unfortunately, complications arise if the
attitudes of th~ 12.5% of males from
statement 1 and the 25.0% of males from
statement 2 are shared by those lawyers who
are- in management positions. This would
mean that management decisions, including
those regarding job assignment and partnership
status, might be subconsciously biased against
females.
Due to the small and age-restricted nature
ofthe NLSY data, further generalizations and
speculations could result in biased conclusions.
It would be very interesting to see how a
larger and more age-diverse sample of lawyers
respond to these statements. Perhaps this is an
area for future research.

v.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

While the analysis of wages/salaries and
partnership status shows significant support
for Bergmann's overcrowding hypothesis,
more can be done in an attempt to clarify and
strengthen the results. Perhaps the most
important area for future research would be
that of determining the exact roles that
feedback effects and statistical discrimination
(imperfect information) play in the origination
of crowding. While it is important to realize
that some attitudes and variables which may
be either directly or indirectly related to gender
cannot be measured in a tangible manner, the
NLSY attitude questions provide a starting
point from which to develop a more in-depth
analysis. Future research could focus on the
attitude analysis of lawyers and law students,
using statements similar to those found in the
NLSY. By analyzing these attitudes, it might
be possible to pinpoint the causes of crowding.
Once the magnitudes of these effects are
isolated, problem areas can be addressed.
Based on the results of this study, a two
step program may be suggested. The first step
would involve combating low female self

esteem; and the second would involve
confronting stereotypes concerning the
"proper" roles of females ~n the professional
and domestic worlds. As Howlett suggests, •
"Our profession [law] is really a reflection of
what is happening in the rest of society"
(ROUNDTABLE 2, p. 28). Until the
stereotypes and misperceptions are eliminated,
Bergmann's model of
labor market
overcrowding may continue to be supported
by much "intangible" evidence, but little
measurable evidence.
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